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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGY  
TRANSFER IN CHINA 
 
Kiel Downey* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The extent to which the People’s Republic of China (China) 
develops and implements renewable energy 1  technology has a 
significant effect on global climate change.  In 2007, China surpassed 
the United States to become the country that emits more carbon 
dioxide per year than any other country in the world,2 and China’s 
emissions have reached double-digit annual growth in the period 
since then. 3   While China has the potential to increase global 
emissions significantly, it also has the potential to mitigate global 
emissions by developing and implementing renewable energy 
technology that can mitigate its share of global emissions.  
According to data from the Pew Charitable Trusts, China ranked 
either number one or number two in total clean energy investment 
among the G-20 countries in 2009, 2010, and 2011,4 and renewable 
                                                          
*  Kiel Downey is Adjunct Faculty and Director of the Master of Arts in 
International Studies program in the Department of Political Science, 
University of South Carolina.  
1   The International Energy Agency defines renewable energy as 
“energy that is derived from natural processes (e.g. sunlight and wind) that 
are replenished at a higher rate than they are consumed.  Solar, wind, 
geothermal, hydro, and biomass are common sources of renewable energy.”  
Topic: Renewables, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY,  http://www.iea.org/to 
pics/renewables (last visited July 26, 2012). 
2  U.S. Energy Info. Admin., International Energy Statistics - Total 
Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the Consumption of Energy (Million Metric 
Tons), U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedind 
ex3.cfm?tid=90&pid=44&aid=8&cid=regions&syid=1980&eyid=2010&unit
=MMTCD (last visited July 26, 2012).  
3  See id.  The author’s calculations are based on data from the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration.  
4   G-20 investments in clean energy have made up the majority of 
global investments in clean energy since at least 2004.  Who’s Winning the 
Clean Energy Race?: 2011 Edition, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, 15 
(2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/ 
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energy made up the vast majority of China’s clean energy investment 
portfolio over that period. 5   As of 2011, China had more total 
installed clean energy capacity than any other country in the world.6   
One way in which China can develop a strong renewable energy 
sector is by acquiring and adapting renewable energy technology 
from other countries.  The United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change7 (the Convention) lists the transfer of clean energy 
technology among measures that can “control, reduce, or prevent” 
greenhouse gas emissions, 8  and many of the Parties to the 
Convention who are leading the way in clean energy investment have 
come to recognize renewable energy as an important part of clean 
energy.  In recent years, some of the largest investors in clean energy 
have made forms of renewable energy the vast majority of their 
investment portfolios.9 
                                                                                                                
Clean_Energy/Clean%20Energy%20Race%20Report%202012.pdf 
[hereinafter THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 2011 Edition]; Who’s Winning the 
Clean Energy Race?, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, 17 (2010),  
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Global_
warming/G20%20Report.pdf? n=5939 [hereinafter THE PEW CHARITABLE 
TRUSTS 2010 Edition]. 
5  See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 2011 Edition, supra note 4, at 14; 
THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 2010 Edition, supra note 4, at 15.   
6  THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 2011 Edition, supra note 4, at 29.   
7 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1982, 1771 
U.N.T.S. 107, 165, available at http://unfccc. int/resource/docs 
/convkp/conveng.pdf. 
8  Id.  
9  See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 2011 Edition, supra note 4, at 14; 
THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 2010 Edition, supra note 4, at 15; U.N. 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 7, at 23.  All the G-
20 countries for which the Pew reports rank clean energy investment are also 
Parties to the Convention. See Status of Ratification of the Convention, U.N. 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/e 
ssential_background/convention/status_of_ratification/ items/2631.php (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2012); List of Annex I Parties to the Convention, U.N. 
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,  http://unfccc.int/par 
ties_and_observers/parties/annex_i/items/2774.php (last visited July 16, 
2012); List of Non-Annex I Parties to the Convention, U.N. FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observer 
s/parties/non_annex_i/items/2833.php (last visited July 16, 2012).  
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The Convention obligates its Parties to “promote and cooperate 
in” the transfer of energy technology10 and obligates the “developed 
country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II” of 
the Convention to facilitate technology transfer to other Parties,11 
which include China.12  Actors from both China and other Parties to 
the Convention, however, have argued that concerns over intellectual 
property rights (IPR) are a significant barrier to the transfer of clean 
energy technology to China, although for different reasons.  For 
example, the U.S. government has argued that widespread 
intellectual property (IP) theft and unreliable IPR enforcement in 
China are significant barriers to technology transfer because 
investors fear counterfeiting and piracy of their IP.  A 2008 
International Trade Administration (ITA) report on clean energy 
technology exports to China states that “[t]he latest U.S. trade losses 
due to counterfeiting and piracy in China remain unacceptably 
high”13 and cites IPR as a challenge to the development of clean 
energy technology business in China.14  Actors from China, on the 
other hand, have argued that industrialized countries are excessively 
protective of their IP, which makes their technology too expensive 
for China to acquire.  For example, Wang Weiquan, head of the 
Clean Development Mechanism program at the China Renewable 
Energy Industries Association, said in a 2009 interview, “[i]f [we] 
buy [developed countries’] equipment, right now it is quite expensive.  
This kind of high cost, developing countries just cannot take it.”15 
                                                          
10   U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 7, at 5.  
11   Id. at 8.  
12  See id. at 8, 24.  The Convention obligates Parties listed in Annex II 
of the Convention to facilitate technology transfer to other Parties.  Status of 
Ratification of the Convention, supra note 9. China is a Party to the 
Convention, but is not an Annex II Party.  
13  Energy and Security Group, Int’l Trade Admin., Clean Energy: An 
Exporter’s Guide to China, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 39 (2008), 
http://www.trade.gov/media/publications/pdf/china-clean-energy2008.pdf.  
14   Id. at 6.  
15  Shi dinghuan: fada guojia ying dapo jianpai jishu zhishichanquan 
jingu (石定寰：发达国家应打破减排技术知识产权禁锢) [Shi Dinghuan: 
Developed Countries Should Break the Confines of Intellectual Property 
Rights over Emissions Reduction Technology], SINA.COM (China), Dec. 15, 
2009, http://finance.sina.com.cn/world/gjjj/20091215/21237107945.shtml.  
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In this article, I examine whether or not concerns over IPR 
actually have been a significant barrier to the transfer of renewable 
energy technology to China.  I treat technology transfer as a form of 
investment, based on calculations of expected risk and return, and 
examine relevant risk and return factors.  In examining expected risk, 
I look at changes in China’s IP laws, changes in China’s enforcement 
of IPR, and the ability of the Chinese renewable energy market to 
turn non-Chinese IP into marketable products.  In examining 
expected return, I look at the potential for growth in China’s 
renewable energy market, pricing in the market, and incentives for 
Chinese and non-Chinese firms to partner.  I then examine empirical 
patenting data and anecdotal evidence and conclude that concerns 
over IPR are not a significant barrier to renewable energy technology 
transfer to China. 
 
I.   TECHNOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN A  
BROAD SENSE 
A.   TECHNOLOGY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO INTELLECTUAL  
PROPERTY 
In order to discuss technology transfer, we need to understand 
how “technology” and the “transfer” of that technology are defined 
in renewable energy.  A narrow understanding of “technology” could 
include only the machinery involved in the process of producing 
energy.  This article adopts a broader notion of technology, as 
described by Grübler.16  Grübler’s concept of technology includes 
intangible, knowledge-based assets, such as the knowledge required 
to produce that machinery, as well as the knowledge required to use 
the machinery effectively.17 
This characterization of technology explains the link between 
renewable energy technology and IP.  For example, in generating 
wind power, power companies need not only physical assets like 
rotors and generators, but also intangible assets, such as the 
knowledge of how to maintain, repair, and improve upon those 
physical assets.  They need not only data collection systems, but also 
an understanding of how to effectively interpret and analyze the data 
they collect.  There must also be an effective grid in place to pass to 
                                                          
16  See ARNULF GRÜBLER, TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBAL CHANGE (1998).  
17  See id. at 20.  
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consumers the energy that those wind turbines produce, and that grid 
requires its own set of physical and knowledge-based assets. 
 
B.   TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AS INVESTMENT 
The transfer of technology is fundamentally a form of 
investment, based on calculations of expected risk and return.  There 
is no centralized international mechanism for coordinating 
technology transfer.  Rather, technology transfer occurs organically 
among various public and private actors through channels such as 
international trade, joint research efforts, licensing, and the cross-
border activities of multinational corporations, all of which require 
an investment of time and resources.  In discussing foreign direct 
investment, Salacuse says that “[i]nvestors will commit funds to a 
project when in their judgment the project will yield a satisfactory 
return at an acceptable level of risk,”18 and any actor considering 
transferring its renewable energy technology to China will consider 
the expected risk and return in that particular market before making a 
decision. 
In examining risk, this article looks at the risk that IP in 
renewable energy technology from industrialized countries will be 
stolen, reverse-engineered, or unsuccessfully protected in China’s 
legal system.  The article examines some of the major steps that 
China has taken since the 1990s to improve its protections for IPR, 
including legal reforms and developments in IPR enforcement, as 
well as the capacity of actors in China’s renewable energy sector to 
turn IP acquired from non-Chinese sources into marketable products. 
In examining return, this article looks at economic factors that 
non-Chinese firms take into account when assessing expected return.  
The article examines prospects for growth and policy support in 
China’s renewable energy sector, pricing in the renewable energy 
market, and incentives for non-Chinese firms to partner with Chinese 
firms in order to show that IPR are not a significant factor in 
calculations of expected return. 
 
                                                          
18   Jeswald Salacuse, Direct Foreign Investment and the Law in 
Developing Countries, 15 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 382, 386 
(2000). 
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II.   RISK FACTORS 
Criticism of China’s protection of non-Chinese IPR reflects a 
variety of opinions on the issue.  For example, in June 2009, then-
U.S. Representative Mark Kirk said that “the Chinese essentially 
were seeking ‘the stealing of all intellectual property’ related to 
energy efficiency and climate change.”19  The Office of the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR) has put China on the Priority 
Watch List of its Special 301 Report every year since 2006,20 and the 
2009 Special 301 Report notes that “China’s IPR enforcement 
regime remains largely ineffective and non-deterrent.”21  The same 
report, however, notes that “when the Chinese government chooses 
to exercise its political will to deal with an IPR problem, it can yield 
results.”22  In subsequent Special 301 Reports, USTR has continued 
to note both ongoing concerns and areas of improvement in China’s 
protection of IPR.23 
                                                          
19  Shaun Tandon, US Draws Line with China on Climate Technology, 
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE (June 22, 2009), http://www.google.com/host 
ednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iJxowxXuScWkFyiTNDYPlHwgkKWw.  
20  OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, 2012 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 26 (2012), http://www.ustr.go 
v/sites/default/files/2012%20Special%20301%20Report.pdf; OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2011 
SPECIAL 301 REPORT 19 (2011), http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2841; 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
2010 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 19 (2010), http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1906; 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
2009 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 13 (2009), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/fil 
es/Full%20Version%20of%20the%202009%20SPECIAL%20301%20REPO
RT.pdf; OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, 2008 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 19 (2008), http://www.ustr.gov/sites 
/default/files/asset_upload_file553_14869.pdf; OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2007 SPECIAL 301 
REPORT 18 (2007), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_fi 
le230_11122.pdf; OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE 
OF THE PRESIDENT, 2006 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 16 (2006), 
http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/
2006/2006_Special_301_Review/asset_upload_file473_9336.pdf. 
21   OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2009 SPECIAL 301 
REPORT, supra note 20, at 13.  
22  Id.  
23   OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2012 SPECIAL 301 
REPORT, supra note 20, at 26–35; OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
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Since the late twentieth century, China has made two major sets 
of reforms to its IPR laws to offer better protection for IPR.  First, 
China made significant reforms to its IPR laws in the 1990s and early 
2000s as it prepared to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and bring its IPR regime in line with international standards.  Second, 
China is now developing enough of its own energy technology that it 
has a homegrown incentive to increase the protection of energy 
technology IPR in its market, and it has made another set of 
significant reforms to its IPR laws since the latter half of the 2000s.  
Together, these two sets of reforms have laid the groundwork for 
more effective protection of IPR in China. 
Enforcement has also become more predictable over this period. 
Improvements to the letter of the law are not sufficient to ensure 
greater protection of IPR, and predictability of enforcement is a 
critical factor in assessing risk.  Data from IP litigation in China 
show that enforcement has been reasonably predictable since at least 
the early 2000s. 
In addition, China’s renewable energy sector as a whole has not 
developed the capability to absorb any given form of pirated IP, 
reducing the risk that actors in China will steal or reverse-engineer 
foreign renewable energy IP.  Renewable energy technology is 
complex and interdependent, and many Chinese firms do not have 
the complementary technology necessary to turn individual 
renewable energy IP into marketable products and services. 
 
A.   REFORMS PRIOR TO WTO ACCESSION 
In the 1990s and early 2000s, China made an important set of 
reforms to its IPR laws in preparation to sign the WTO agreements. 
The WTO agreements included the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),24 and China would 
have to bring its domestic IPR legislation up to minimum 
                                                                                                                
REPRESENTATIVE, 2011 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 20, at 19–25; 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2010 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, 
supra note 20, at 19–23.  
24  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter 
TRIPS]. 
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international standards in order to meet its obligations under TRIPS 
upon accession to the WTO in 2001.25 
 
1.   THE CONTRACT LAW 
No Chinese laws specifically address the protection of IP in 
renewable energy technology, but in 1999, two years before China 
signed TRIPS, the National People’s Congress (NPC)—China’s 
national legislature—adopted the Contract Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (Contract Law).26  The Contract Law contains a 
chapter that focuses specifically on contracts for technology,27 and 
that chapter contains a section that focuses specifically on contracts 
for technology transfer.28 
The Contract Law mitigates the risk associated with technology 
transfer by creating a formal framework in which IP can be 
transferred.  For example, it defines the types of IP that can be 
transferred through a contract,29 it specifies that such contracts must 
be in writing, 30  and it defines the legal obligations of both the 
transferor31 and the recipient32 in a technology transfer agreement.  
The Contract Law also obligates the recipient of transferred 
technology to maintain the confidentiality of trade secrets.33 
                                                          
25  TRIPS binds its Parties to a broad set of standards for domestic IPR 
legislation.  The Preamble to TRIPS sets forth this principle.  It states that the 
parties to the Agreement recognize the “need for new rules and disciplines 
concerning… the provision of adequate standards and principles concerning 
the availability, scope and use of trade-related intellectual property rights… 
[and] the provision of effective and appropriate means for the enforcement of 
trade-related intellectual property rights, taking into account differences in 
national legal systems.”  Id. at Preamble, 320.  
26  Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hetong fa (中华人民共和国合同法) 
[Contract Law of the P.R.C.] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 1999; effective Oct 1, 1999) (China) [hereinafter 
Contract Law], available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-
12/11/content_1383564.htm. 
27  Id. at ch. 18.  
28  Id.  
29  Id. at ch. 18, art. 342. 
30  Id. 
31  Id. at ch. 18, art. 345. 
32  Id. at ch. 18, art. 346. 
33  Id. at ch. 18, art. 348. 
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However, the Contract Law does not reduce all forms of risk to 
non-Chinese owners of IP.  For example, Article 353 appears to 
increase risk to transferors of technology, because it makes the 
transferor liable when the recipient exploits the patent or technical 
secret under the terms of the contract in a way that “infringes upon 
the legitimate rights and interests of others.”34  This provision is 
broadly worded, and transferors must be careful about what 
technology they transfer and to whom they transfer it.  According to 
the language of this provision, however, the transferor only incurs 
liability when the recipient uses the transferred technology “as 
contracted” and “infringes on the lawful interests” of others.35  Thus, 
at the very least, this provision gives the transferor the power to draft 
a contract in a way that minimizes the risk to the transferor. 
Article 329 of the Contract Law also appears to present some 
risk to non-Chinese transferors of technology.  Article 329 deems a 
contract that “illegally monopolizes technology” 36  or “impedes 
technological advancement” invalid, 37  and the 2005 Supreme 
People’s Court Interpretation Regarding Several Issues in the 
Application of Law for the Trial of Technology Contract Dispute 
Cases 38  (Technology Contracts Interpretation) clarifies these 
provisions.  The Technology Contracts Interpretation states that a 
contract that prohibits research and development (R&D) or 
improvements upon licensed technology “illegally monopoli[zes] 
technology [or] impairs technological advancement.” 39   As this 
interpretation makes it easier under the law for Chinese firms that 
license foreign technology to design marginal improvements and 
compete with their foreign licensors, it represents an increased risk to 
foreign transferors of technology.  This risk is likely mitigated by the 
relatively low absorptive capacity of China’s renewable energy 
industry, as discussed in Part II, Section D, below. 
                                                          
34  Id. at ch. 18, art. 353. 
35  Id. (emphasis added).   
36  Id. at ch. 18, art. 329. 
37  Id.  
38   Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shenli jishu hetong jiufen anjian 
shiyong falü ruogan wenti de jieshi (最高人民法院关于审理技术合同纠纷
案件适用法律若干问题的解释) [Supreme People’s Court interpretation of 
the applicable law, a number of issues on the trial of the technology contract 
disputes] (Sup. People’s Ct., November 30, 2004) (China).   
39  Id. at art. 10 (citing Contract Law, supra note 26, at art. 329). 
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2.   THE PATENT LAW 
In addition to the Contract Law, the Standing Committee of the 
NPC amended the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(Patent Law) in 2000,40 in preparation for compliance with TRIPS.41  
As the NPC Standing Committee amended the Patent Law again in 
2008,42 during China’s second major set of legal reforms, this article 
examines the Patent Law in Part II, Section B, below. 
 
3.   TRIPS 
In renewable energy technology, the most relevant type of IPR 
protection is the patent, as it covers technological products and 
processes.  Also, TRIPS provides additional clarity and protection for 
foreign patent holders.  Article 27 of TRIPS requires all parties to the 
Agreement to make patents available “for any inventions, whether 
products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they 
are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial 
application.”43  Article 27 gives equal protection to foreign patent 
applicants by providing that “patents shall be available and patent 
rights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, 
the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally 
produced.”44 
In addition, the WTO has actually enforced China’s obligations 
under TRIPS.  There have been no WTO dispute settlement cases 
directly involving renewable energy technology in China, but a WTO 
                                                          
40  Zhonghua renmin gonghego zhuanlifa (中华人民共和国专利法) 
[Patent Law of the P.R.C.] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. People’s 
Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective Apr. 1, 1985, amended Sept. 4, 1992; 
amended Aug. 25, 2000, amended Dec. 27, 2008) (China) [hereinafter Patent 
Law], available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/200712/13/ 
content_1383992.htm. 
41  J. Benjamin Bai et al., What Does the Third Amendment to China’s 
Patent Law Mean to You?, JONES DAY, 1 (2009), http://www.jones 
day.com/files/Publication/4bec1582-391d-497a-af19bb314ae94433 
/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ff879450-6699-4f2a-93fe-c33eb 
7d604cc/What%20Does%20Third.pdf. 
42  Patent Law, supra note 40, at ch.1, art. 1.   
43  TRIPS, supra note 24, at art. 2. 
44  Id. 
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Dispute Settlement Body panel found in 2009 that the Copyright Law 
of the People’s Republic of China 45 (Copyright Law) and certain 
measures of Chinese customs violated China’s commitments under 
TRIPS.46  The panel did not uphold all the claims against China,47 
but the case proved that China’s IPR laws could be successfully 
challenged under the WTO framework. 
 
B.   DOMESTIC INNOVATION AND REFORMS IN THE LATTER HALF OF  
THE 2000S 
The Chinese government and Communist Party have taken steps 
since the mid-2000s to encourage the development of IP—including 
renewable energy—in China’s economy, and in the process they 
have increased protections under the law for foreign IP within 
China’s borders.  Some knowledge-based sectors of China’s 
economy have experienced significant growth in recent years, and 
China has dedicated significant resources to Chinese innovators.  For 
example, the number of patent holders in emerging market 
economies grew by 33% from 1998 to 2008, but almost all of that 
growth occurred in China. 48  Chinese patent holders held almost 92% 
of all locally owned patents in emerging market economies in 2008.49  
From 2004 to 2008, funding for science and technology activities in 
China increased by 111%.50  Over the same period, expenditure on 
                                                          
45  Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhuzuoquan fa (中华人民共和国著作
权法) [Copyright Law of the P.R.C.] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990; effective June 1, 1991; amended Oct. 27, 
2001) (China), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-
12/12/content_1383888.htm.  
46  See Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 134, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 
2009). 
47  See id.; see also Michael Geist, Why the U.S. Lost Its WTO IP 
Complaint against China Badly, MICHAEL GEIST BLOG (Jan. 27, 2009), 
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/3645/125. 
48  Copenhagen Econ. A/S & The IPR Co. ApS, Are IPR a Barrier to 
the Transfer of Climate Change Technology?, COPENHAGEN ECON. 5 (2009), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/february/tradoc_142371.pdf. 
49  Id. 
50 National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 
2009, 820, available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2009/indexeh.htm. 
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R&D grew by 135% and increased as a share of GDP from 1.23% to 
1.54%.51 
China’s renewable energy sector is one of the knowledge-based 
sectors that has experienced significant development since the mid-
2000s, in terms of both its output and its IP.  For example, Figure 1 
shows the net electricity generated from renewable sources from 
1980 to 2010 by the four countries that generate more than any other 
country: Canada, the United States, Brazil, and China. 52   At the 
beginning of this period, China lagged behind the other three, but it 
surpassed them all in 2005 and maintained its leading position in 
each subsequent year for which data is available.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
51  Id. 
52   Figure 1 is based on data from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration. At the time of this writing, the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration did not provide data for years beyond 2010.  See U.S. Energy 
Info. Admin., Total Renewable Electricity Net Generation (Billion 
Kilowatthours), U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, http://www.eia.gov 
/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=6&pid=29&aid=12&cid=BR,CA,CH,
US,&syid=1980&eyid=2010&unit=BKWH (last visited July 25, 2012) 
[hereinafter U.S. EIA, Total Renewable Electricity].  
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 Figure 1 Net Generation of Electricity from 
   Renewable Sources, 1980-2010 
 
Source: Based on data from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration 
Figure 2 takes the period in which China held the number one 
position and converts the data into annual percent changes.53  China’s 
growth in generation was higher than each of Canada, the United 
States, and Brazil in four out of those six years, and China’s 
generation climbed to 32.59% growth in 2010, its highest growth 
over that period.54 The International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts 
that the capacity of China’s renewable energy sector will continue to 
grow.  The Reference Scenario of the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 
2007 projects that, from 2005 to 2030, China’s hydropower capacity 
                                                          
53  Id.  The data in Figure 2 is based on the data in Figure 1 over the 
period from 2005 to 2010.  Percent change calculations are the author’s.  The 
U.S. Energy Information Administration does not provide data for years 
beyond 2010.   
54  Id. 
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will increase by 153% and its wind power capacity by 2,208%.55  
The World Energy Outlook 2010 projects that, from 2008 to 2035, 
China will account for approximately 20% of the global net increase 
in renewable energy demand.56 
 
 Figure 2  Annual Change in Net Generation of 
   Electricity from Renewable Sources, 
   2005-2010 
 
Source: Based on data from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration 
China’s renewable energy sector has grown not only larger, but 
also more technologically sophisticated.  According to data from Lee 
et al., by 2009, China held significant shares of worldwide patents in 
various renewable energy technologies, including over 10% of  
                                                          
55  World Energy Outlook 2007: China and India Insights, 
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, 355 (2007), http://iea.org/publications/fr 
eepublications/publication/weo_2007.pdf [hereinafter  INTERNATIONAL 
ENERGY AGENCY, World Outlook].   
56  Id. at 99.   
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worldwide patents in wind power, biomass, and concentrated solar 
power (CSP).57  When those numbers are adjusted to account for the 
geographic origin of the parent companies, Chinese companies still 
held approximately 5% to 8% of global patents in those 
technologies.58 
As IP has become an increasingly important part of China’s 
economy, new language in official policy documents and laws in the 
latter half of the 2000s reflects an increased high-level emphasis on 
encouraging knowledge-based sectors of China’s economy, including 
renewable energy, as discussed in the next section.  As China 
increases official support for Chinese innovators, it also reduces the 
expected risk for foreign innovators who are considering transferring 
their IP into the Chinese market.  Under the national treatment 
principle in TRIPS, China has an obligation to treat the IP of other 
TRIPS signatories in a manner “no less favourable” than that in 
which it treats the IP of Chinese innovators, 59  giving China an 
obligation to extend improved protections for IP to foreign owners of 
IP who operate within China’s borders. 
 
1.   HIGH-LEVEL POLICY DOCUMENTS 
China’s Eleventh Five-Year Plan60  lists the following among 
China’s national policy goals: “strengthening of independent 
                                                          
57  Bernice Lee et al., Who Owns Our Low-Carbon Future?: Intellectual 
Property and Energy Technologies, CHATHAM HOUSE, 15 (2009), 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Energy,%2
0Environment%20and%20 Development/r0909_lowcarbonfuture.pdf.    
58  Id. 
59  TRIPS, supra note 24, at art. 3.   
60  China’s “Five-Year Plans” are sets of national-level guidelines for 
economic and social development that cover five-year increments and are 
based on official recommendations from the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China, a high-level decision-making authority within 
the Communist Party.  The National People’s Congress, China’s national 
legislature, approves outlines of each Five-Year Plan for official public 
release, and each of these outlines is commonly referred to as a “Five-Year 
Plan.”  The Eleventh Five-Year Plan covers the period from 2006 to 2010.  
Outline of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social 
Development, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui fazhan 
di shiyi ge wu nian guihua gangyao (中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展
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innovative capability, increasing research and development 
expenditure as a share of GDP to 2% [by 2010], and forming a body 
of superior industries that have independent intellectual property, 
well-known brands, and stronger international competitiveness.” 61  
China’s 2008 Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy62 
also discusses the importance of IP in depth.  For example, the 
opening paragraph states that the Outline is “formulated for the 
purpose of improving China's capacity to create, utilize, protect and 
administer intellectual property, making China an innovative country 
and attaining the goal of building a moderately prosperous society in 
all respects.”63  
 
2.   THE ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW 
In 2007, the Standing Committee of the NPC adopted China’s 
first antitrust law, the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic 
of China (Anti-Monopoly Law). 64  Patents grant monopoly rights to 
patent holders over a fixed period of time, and of all the laws 
                                                                                                                
第十一个五年规划纲要) [National development and social development in 
the Eleventh Five-Year Plan Outline] (promulgated by National People’s 
Cong., Mar. 16, 2006) Xinhua News Agency (China) [hereinafter Eleventh 
Five-Year Plan], available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/misc/2006-
03/16/content_4309517.htm.  
61  Id. at ch. 1, § 3. 
62  The Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy was issued 
by the State Council, the highest executive authority in the government of 
the People’s Republic of China.  Guojia zhishichanquan zhanlüe gangyao 
(国家知识产权战略纲要) [Outline of the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy] (promulgated by the State Council of the People’s Republic of 
China, June 5, 2008), available at http://english.gov.cn/2008-
06/21/content_1023471.htm.   
63  Id.  
64  Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fanlongduan fa (中华人民共和国反垄
断法) [Anti-Monopoly Law of the P.R.C.] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat'l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) (China) 
[hereinafter Anti-Monopoly Law], available at http://www.npc.go 
v.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471587.htm; see Peter J. Wang & 
Yizhe Zhang, New Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, JONES DAY (2007), 
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/eb6dcb2a-624d-4242-b791-
cc8faa3a1e52/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/4836e746-cc52-49cd-
b96c-d764ae9bea1a/New%20Chinese%20Anti-Monopoly.pdf.   
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discussed in this paper, the Anti-Monopoly Law poses the greatest 
risk to foreign firms who transfer their IP into the Chinese market. 
Wang and Zhang provide a thorough explanation of the various 
provisions in the Anti-Monopoly Law that could increase risk to 
foreign firms transferring IP into the Chinese market.65  One example 
relates to the autonomy that licensors have to prohibit licensees from 
patenting improvements to the licensors’ technology.66  Article 13(4) 
prohibits “restricting the purchase of new technology or new 
facilities or the development of new technology or new products.”67  
Wang & Zhang note that contracts that prohibit research and 
development or improvements upon licensed technology can be 
interpreted as “illegal monopoly of technology” under the 
Technology Contracts Interpretation,68 which could lead them to be 
interpreted as “impair[ing] technological advancement.”69  If read 
together, the Anti-Monopoly Law and the Technology Contracts 
Interpretation may make it difficult for foreign licensors of 
technology to prevent Chinese licensees from patenting 
improvements to foreign technology. 
Another important provision, echoing the argument from 
developing countries that IPR protection makes technology too 
expensive to acquire, is Article 17(1), which prohibits “a business 
operator with a dominant market position” from “selling 
commodities at unfairly high prices . . . .”70  The law does not define 
“dominant market position,” but it is reasonable to assume that a 
                                                          
65  Wang & Zhang, supra note 64, at 3–4.   
66  Id. at 3.   
67  Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 64, at ch. 2, art. 13(4).   
68  Wang & Zhang, supra note 64, at 3 (quoting Zuigao renmin fayuan 
guanyu shenli jishu hetong jiufen anjian shiyong falü ruogan wenti de jieshi 
(最高人民法院关于审理技术合同纠纷案件适用法律若干问题的解释) 
[Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court concerning Some Issues on 
Application of Law for the Trial of Cases on Disputes over Technology 
Contracts] (Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 16, 2004) (China) art. 10).  
69   Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shenli jishu hetong jiufen anjian 
shiyong falü ruogan wenti de jieshi (最高人民法院关于审理技术合同纠纷
案件适用法律若干问题的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme People's 
Court concerning Some Issues on Application of Law for the Trial of Cases 
on Disputes over Technology Contracts] (Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 16, 2004) 
(China) art. 10.  
70  Anti-Monopoly Law, supra note 64, at ch. 3, art. 17(1).    
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Chinese court would be more likely to determine that a company 
with a greater market share occupies a dominant market position than 
a company with a smaller market share, and that certain foreign firms 
hold significant market share in China’s renewable energy market.  
For example, in 2007, GE Wind, a U.S. company; Gamesa, a Spanish 
company; and Vestas, a Danish company, held the fourth-, fifth-, and 
sixth-largest market shares in China’s wind power market, 
respectfully.71 
 
3.   THE PATENT LAW 
While the Contract Law, discussed earlier, contains specific 
provisions for technology transfer, the Patent Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (Patent Law) represents a much more significant 
effort to reduce the risk associated with technology.  The Patent Law, 
originally adopted in 1984, was amended in 2000 72  in order to 
comply with TRIPS.73  It was amended again in 2008,74 and this 
section focuses on the 2008 amendment. 
The 2008 Patent Law reflects China’s efforts to foster and 
protect innovation.  The purposes of the 2000 Patent Law were to 
“protect patent rights for inventions, encourage inventions and 
facilitate their popularization and application, encourage progress 
and innovation in science and technology, and meet the needs of 
socialist modernization.”75  The 2008 amendment, however, added 
the goal of “enhancing innovation capability.”76 
With this goal in mind, several provisions in the amended Patent 
Law significantly mitigate the risk to the owners of IP in the process 
of technology transfer. 77   For example, the 2000 Patent Law 
stipulates that an invention must possess “novelty” in order to be 
patentable, but the law does not consider prior use or knowledge 
outside of China in determining novelty.78  The amended 2008 Patent 
                                                          
71  Energy and Security Group, Int’l Trade Admin., supra note 13, at 45.   
72  Patent Law, supra note 40.   
73  Bai et al., supra note 41, at 1.   
74  Patent Law, supra note 40.   
75  Id. at ch.1, art. 1. 
76  Id. 
77  This discussion of the significance of the 2008 amended Patent Law 
in general draws on analysis by Bai et al.  Bai et al., supra note 41.   
78  Patent Law, supra note 40, at ch. 2, art. 22. 
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Law extends the standard for novelty to prior use or knowledge 
outside of China.79  As Bai et al. explain, this new standard requires 
Chinese courts to consider public knowledge or use outside of China 
when assessing patent validity.80  Under this new standard, foreign 
firms may draw on a broader body of prior art in challenging patents 
registered in China that they allege conflict with their own.  While 
the 2000 law makes it illegal to make, sell, or import a product 
covered by a patent,81 the amended law expands this list of activities 
to include offering to sell a product covered by a patent,82 providing 
greater protection to both Chinese and foreign IP. 
One aspect of the 2008 amendment to the Patent Law that could 
affect renewable energy technology is its provisions that relate to 
“genetic resources,”83 as these provisions could have important risk 
implications in the biofuel industry.  Biofuel firms are paying an 
increasing amount of attention to the use of genetic engineering in 
producing low-emission, “second-generation” biofuels, 84  and it is 
unclear how the 2008 Patent Law would treat such technology.  The 
Patent law does not define “genetic resources,” yet it requires those 
who want to patent products that depend on genetic resources to 
disclose the source of those genetic resources, or at least explain why 
they cannot disclose the source.85  At face value, this provision does 
not preclude biofuel firms from patenting their inventions, but it 
places an unusual burden on patent applicants,86 and it forces them to 
reveal more of their IP than they had to under the 2000 amendment.  
                                                          
79  Id.; see also Bai et al., supra note 41.  
80  Bai et al., supra note 41, at 1–2. 
81  Patent Law, supra note 40, at ch. 1, art. 11. 
82  Id. 
83  Id. at ch.3, art 26.  Prior to the 2008 amendment, the Patent Law did 
not contain references to “genetic resources.” 
84   For example, at the 2009 Bio World Congress on Industrial 
Biotechnology, in July 2009, biotechnology firms gathered to discuss how 
genetic engineering and biotechnology could be used to produce second-
generation biofuels.  See, e.g., John Lorinc, The Food, Energy and 
Environment ‘Trilemma,’ THE NEW YORK TIMES (July 31, 2009), 
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/the-food-energy-and-
environment-trilemma/.  
85  Patent Law, supra note 40, at ch.3, art. 26.   
86  Bai et al., supra note 41, at 3 (noting that no such requirement exists 
in American, European, or Japanese patent law).   
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For this reason, this provision does increase the expected risk to 
foreign transferors of biofuel technology. 
Despite this risk, however, the market for biofuels in China is 
relatively small, and so the risk that the Patent Law poses to biofuel 
firms is a small portion of total risk for non-Chinese renewable 
energy firms.  For example, the World Energy Outlook 2007’s 
Reference Scenario estimates that biofuels will account for only “2% 
of road fuel consumption” in China by 2030.87 
 
C.   DEVELOPMENTS IN ENFORCEMENT 
The legal reforms that China undertook in preparation to accede 
to the WTO and again in the latter half of the 2000s have improved 
protections for foreign IP in the letter of the law, but risk to foreign 
investors can only decrease if effective enforcement accompanies 
China’s improved laws.  According to data from Sepetys and Cox’s 
2009 analysis of IP litigation in China, based on data from 2002 to 
2008, IP litigation in China produced predictable trends as of the late 
2000s, making it easier for foreign firms to predict the outcome of 
IPR litigation.88  First, the value of damages awarded by the courts 
has become more predictable.  Damages in IPR cases in China tend 
to be low,89 but although Sepetys and Cox argue that low damages 
fail to significantly deter infringers, 90  foreign firms are able to 
estimate the outcome of an IPR lawsuit.  According to Sepetys and 
Cox, the median value of damages awarded for all IPR cases in 
China in 2006 and 2007 was close to $15,000.91  This amount may 
seem low, but plaintiffs in China also tend to claim low damages,92 
and the median value of damages awarded is equal to approximately 
                                                          
87  INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, World Outlook, supra note 55, at 
299.   
88   Kristina Sepetys & Alan Cox, Intellectual Property Rights 
Protection in China: Trends in Litigation and Economic Damages, NERA 
ECONOMIC CONSULTING, 8 (2009), http://www.nera.com/extImage 
/PUB_IPR_Protection_China_0109_final.pdf. 
89  Id. at 6. 
90  Id. 
91  Id. at 8. 
92  Id. 
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15% of damages claimed.93  At the very least, firms can factor in IPR 
litigation as a predictable cost of business. 
Second, foreign firms seem to experience more favorable 
outcomes in IPR litigation than Chinese firms do.  Sepetys and Cox 
note that in all the cases they examined in which the plaintiffs were 
Chinese, the median damages awarded equaled approximately 5% of 
median damages claimed.94  In the cases they examined in which the 
plaintiffs were foreign, however, the median damages awarded 
equaled approximately 33% of damages claimed, 95  twenty-eight 
percentage points higher than the figure for Chinese plaintiffs. 
Third, foreign firms are turning to Chinese courts more often, 
reflecting their confidence in the courts as a viable mechanism for 
resolving IPR disputes.96  In China, IPR enforcement is handled by 
either the courts or by administrative agencies.97  Sepetys and Cox 
note that from 2001—the year that China signed TRIPS—to 2008, 
there was a 50% annual increase in the number of IPR court cases 
involving foreign firms in China.98 
 
D.   ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY 
Although China made efforts to reform its IPR laws and improve 
enforcement, one of the most important reasons that foreign firms 
face a relatively low level of risk in transferring renewable energy 
technology to China has nothing to do with the law, but with 
“absorptive capacity.” 99   Cohen and Levinthal define absorptive 
capacity as “the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, 
external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial 
ends.”100  Most Chinese renewable energy firms have not developed 
                                                          
93  Id. 
94  Id. at 13.  
95  Id. 
96  See id. at 4. 
97  Id. 
98  Id. at 5.   
99  See generally Copenhagen Economics, supra note 48, at 28–31.   
100  Wesley M. Cohen & Daniel A. Levinthal, Absorptive Capacity: a 
New Perspective on Learning and Innovation, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. (SPECIAL 
ISSUE) 128, 128 (1990). 
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the capability, or absorptive capacity, to effectively turn IP acquired 
from foreign firms into marketable products or services. 
While China generates more electricity from renewable sources 
than any other country in the world,101 China’s renewable energy 
industry is not as technologically advanced as that of some other 
countries that make significant use of renewable sources of energy.  
For example, China’s energy consumption comes largely from 
coal,102 rather than from renewable sources; based on available data, 
China’s share of electricity generated from renewable sources was 
below the world average eighteen out of nineteen years between 
1991 and 2009.103  China is the world’s largest consumer of biomass, 
but that biomass is almost entirely traditional biomass, and only 1.5% 
of China’s biomass was used in power generation in 2005.104 
Patent and market share data also show that China lags behind 
many industrialized countries in renewable energy technology.  In 
Lee et al., figure 2.7 shows that, as of 2009, China held significant 
shares of worldwide patents in various renewable energy 
technologies, including over 10% of worldwide patents in wind 
power, biomass, and CSP.105  When those numbers are adjusted to 
account for the geographic origin of the parent companies, Chinese 
companies still hold approximately 5% to 8% of global patents in 
                                                          
101  According to data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
China’s net electricity generation from renewable sources was more than that 
of any other country in the world between 2005 and 2010.  See U.S. EIA, 
Total Renewable Electricity, supra note 52 (shown in billion kilowatthours).  
Note that at the time of this writing, the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration did not provide data for years beyond 2010.   
102  In 2006, 70% of China’s energy consumption came from coal.  U.S. 
Energy Info. Admin., Country Analysis Briefs: China, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, 
1 (2010), http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/China/china.pdf.  Note 
that the figures updated since the writing of this paper are consistent with the 
2006 figures noted here. 
103  The author’s calculations are based on data from the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration. See U.S. EIA, Total Renewable Electricity, 
supra note 52.  Note that at the time of this writing, the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration did not provide the data necessary for 
calculations for years beyond 2009.  
104  INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, World Outlook, supra note 55, at 
354.  
105  Lee et al. supra note 57, at 15 fig.2.7. 
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those technologies,106 but the shares of Japan and the United States 
increase dramatically relative to those of China after the 
adjustment. 107   In addition, the data in figure 2.7, at face value, 
suggests that China’s renewable energy sector is more 
technologically advanced than that of the United Kingdom, France, 
Canada, South Korea, Italy, Russia, and India, as China’s patent 
share is greater than the patent share of any of those countries in all 
the categories listed except carbon capture.108  As of 2011, however, 
China’s economy was 2.6 times larger than that of France,109 the 
country in the above list with the largest economy,110 suggesting that 
China does not produce as much IP per unit of GDP as those other 
countries.  In an environment with less density of innovation, 
Chinese firms cannot simply acquire IP from firms in industrialized 
countries and turn it into marketable products and services, because 
those industrialized countries have developed webs of renewable 
energy technology that depend on complementary technology for 
support. 
If renewable energy in China were as technologically advanced 
as it is in industrialized countries, more Chinese companies would 
occupy top market positions in China. For example, in the wind 
turbine generator industry one-third of the leading companies were 
foreign as of 2008.111 
If Chinese renewable energy firms were able to integrate foreign 
IP into their operations fluidly, there would be large markets for 
pirated renewable energy IP in China.  USTR periodically reports 
lists of “notorious markets” around the world, in which IPR 
infringement is particularly widespread, but no such renewable 
energy market is included in the most recent list.112  China contained 
                                                          
106  Id. 
107  Id. 
108  Id. 
109 See GDP (current US$), WORLD BANK (last visited Sept. 30, 2012) 
http://data.worldbank.org /indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.  Note that at the 
time of this writing, the World Bank did not provide data for years beyond 
2011. 
110  Id. 
111  See Energy and Security Group, Int’l Trade Admin., supra note 13, 
at 45. 
112  See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF NOTORIOUS MARKETS (Feb. 28, 
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eight out of the thirty-three notorious markets listed in 2011,113 but 
these markets are primarily for consumer products such as mp3s,114 
products of a very different nature than energy technology.  In the 
data that Sepetys and Cox consider, the companies that appear most 
frequently in IPR litigation are in the entertainment and apparel 
industries; 115 it is not surprising that these industries are frequent 
targets for IPR infringers.  Pirating mp3s or DVDs, or counterfeiting 
shoes or handbags, for example, are activities that can be done with 
simple, widely available technology at a low cost.  The generation, 
transmission, distribution, and sale of power from renewable energy 
sources, however, requires a vast, complex network of products, 
processes, trade secrets, and know-how.  Without a strong base of its 
own complementary technology, a Chinese renewable energy firm 
that gains access to one piece of foreign technology cannot 
necessarily integrate that piece of technology into its operations. 
Black markets valued at tens of millions of dollars and above 
exist for simple consumer goods in China, such as books, movies, 
music, software, and video games,116 but those goods are already 
end-use consumer products and can be sold easily.  If a buyer in 
China purchases counterfeit DVDs, for example, he can use those 
products immediately, without any intermediate steps.  If a buyer 
purchases stolen information regarding the chemical composition of 
a biofuel, however, that buyer must have a very specialized set of 
complementary skills, know-how, and equipment in order to make 
use of that information. 
Weak absorptive capacity also mitigates the risk that Article 329 
of the Contract Law and the various provisions of the Anti-Monopoly 
Law pose, discussed previously.  While Chinese firms may be able to 
engineer technological improvements to IP acquired from foreign 
                                                                                                                
2011), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/reports-and-
publications/2011/.   
113  Id. Calculation does not include Hong Kong. 
114  Id. 
115  See Sepetys & Cox, supra note 88, at 9.  
116  As of September 6, 2012, the black markets for these goods in 
China equaled $52 million (books), $565 million (movies), $466.3 million 
(music), $8.9 billion (software), and $589.9 million (video games). China 
Black Markets, HAVOSCOPE, http://www.havocscope.com/tag/china/ (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2012).  
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sources, these Chinese firms must be able to sell or make use of those 
improvements in order to profit from them.  
 
III.   RETURN FACTORS 
Now that this article has examined the risks that owners of 
renewable energy IP may consider before exposing that IP to the 
Chinese market, it turns to return factors.  Are IPR a significant 
barrier to non-Chinese renewable energy firms who want to earn a 
satisfactory return in the Chinese market?  In China, the potential for 
growth in the renewable energy sector, the extent of competition 
among firms in the sector, and the incentives for foreign firms to 
partner with Chinese firms lead to an expected return that outweighs 
concerns about IPR. 
 
A.   PROSPECTS FOR GROWTH 
Non-Chinese owners of renewable energy IP can expect China’s 
renewable energy sector to continue to grow, as China’s leadership 
has pledged to support the sector.  China has generated tremendous 
economic growth since it began major economic reforms in 1978,117 
and rapidly increasing demand for energy has accompanied those 
increasing levels of economic activity.  For example, total primary 
energy consumption in China more than quintupled from 1980 to 
2009,118 and energy demand in China continues to accelerate.  In the 
period from 2000 to 2009 alone, China experienced over 2.6 times as 
                                                          
117  See GDP Growth (Annual %), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank. 
org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG (last visited Sept. 30, 2012) 
(comparing rates, showing that China’s annual GDP growth rate averaged 
9.99% from 1980 to 2011).  Note that at the time of this writing, the World 
Bank did not provide data for years before 1980 or after 2011. 
118  See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., International Energy Statistics - 
Total Primary Energy Consumption, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, 
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=44&pid=44&aid=
2&cid=CH,&syid=1980&eyid=2009&unit =QBTU (last visited Sept. 30, 
2012) (provided in quadrillion Btu).  Note that at the time of this writing, the 
U.S. Energy Information Administration did not provide relevant data for 
years beyond 2009.  
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much growth in primary energy consumption as it had in the 
preceding twenty years.119 
China’s Five-Year Plans, 120  which outline high-level official 
priorities, guidelines, and goals for China’s national development, 
call for increased development of renewable energy.  For example, 
the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, which covers the period from 2006–
2010, cites high levels of energy resource consumption as a problem 
that emerged during the rapid development of the period from 2001–
2005121 and calls for the “implementation of preferential financial, 
tax, and investment policies and mandatory market share policies, the 
encouragement of renewable energy generation and consumption, 
and increasing the proportion of [renewable energy] in primary 
energy.”122  The most recent plan, the Twelfth Five-Year Plan,123 
which covers the period from 2011–2015, calls for an increase in the 
proportion of renewable energy consumption in primary energy 
consumption124 and calls for an “emphasis on the development of a 
new generation of nuclear power, the generation of electricity from 
solar thermal energy and photovoltaic thermal energy, wind power 
technology and equipment, a smart grid, and energy from 
biomass.”125  
Additional official documents elaborate on the guidelines 
stipulated in the Five-Year Plans.  For example, the Medium- to 
Long-Term Renewable Energy Development Plan of China’s State 
Council, the chief executive agency of the government, stipulates 
specific targets in the installed capacity of various sources of 
                                                          
119  See id. (showing that from 1980 to 1999, China’s total primary 
energy demand increased by 19.95 quadrillion Btu, and from 2000 to 2009, it 
increased by 53.06 quadrillion Btu). 
120  See Eleventh Five-Year Plan, supra note 60. 
121  Id. at ch. 1, § 1.  
122  Id. at ch. 3, § 12(4). 
123  Outline of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and 
Social Development, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guomin jingji he shehui 
fazhan di shier ge wu nian guihua gangyao (中华人民共和国国民经济和社
会发展第十二个五年规划纲要 ) [National development and social 
development in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan Outline] (promulgated by 
National People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2011), Xinhua News Agency (China), 
available at http://www.gov.cn/2011lh/content_1825838.htm.  
124  Id. at ch. 1, § 3.   
125  Id. at ch. 1, § 10. 
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renewable energy.126  The Renewable Energy Law of the People’s 
Republic of China127 (Renewable Energy Law) also contributes to the 
supportive policy framework for renewable energy.128  It mandates 
grid access for renewable electricity 129  and establishes a feed-in 
tariff130 to ensure that there are buyers for renewable electricity.  It 
also encourages preferential loans for renewable energy projects,131 
and it commits the government to offering renewable energy project 
tax benefits,132 which have been implemented for a wide variety of 
renewable energy technologies.133  The Renewable Energy Law also 
establishes funding for research, development, and demonstration in 
renewable energy technology.134 
 
B.   COMPETITIVE PRICING 
As mentioned previously, actors in China have argued that IPR 
are a barrier to technology transfer because firms with exclusive 
rights to their IP are able to charge prices for their technology that 
are too high for developing countries to afford.  In China’s renewable 
energy market, however, there is enough competition and diversity in 
the renewable energy market that monopolistic pricing is not possible.  
                                                          
126   Medium- to Long-Term Renewable Energy Development Plan, 
Kezaisheng nengyuan zhongchangqi fazhan guihua (可再生能源中长期发
展 规 划 ) [Renewable energy and long-term development planning] 
(promulgated by State Council of the People’s Republic of China, effective 
June 7, 2007), available at http://img2.dichan.com/docs/2010/1/30/ 
20100130231553858005.pdf.  
127  Zhonghua renmin gonghheguo ke zai sheng nengyuan fa (中华人民
共和国可再生能源法) [Renewable Energy Law of the P.R.C.] (promulgated 
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Feb. 28, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 
2006) (China) [hereinafter Renewable Energy Law], available at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384096.htm.   
128  For a detailed discussion of the provisions of the Renewable Energy 
Law, see Energy and Security Group, Int’l Trade Admin., supra note 13, at 
27–28. 
129  Renewable Energy Law, supra note 127, at ch. 4, art. 14.    
130  Id. at ch. 5, art. 19. 
131  Id. at ch. 6, art. 25. 
132  Id. at ch. 6, art. 26. 
133  See Energy and Security Group, Int’l Trade Admin., supra note 13, 
at 29–30.  
134  Renewable Energy Law, supra note 127, at ch. 3, art. 12. 
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Premiums on IP have been brought down to competitive levels, and 
foreign firms can expect reasonable returns under these market 
conditions. 
Data reported by the ITA shows that no foreign firms dominate 
any of the various renewable energy markets in China.  For example, 
in the wind power market, there were “over 80 wind turbine 
generator manufacturers and 200 wind developers” as of 2008 and 
Chinese companies occupied over 75% of the market. 135  
Furthermore, according to the World Energy Outlook 2007, 
competition between Chinese and foreign firms in the wind power 
market may “put downward pressure on turbine prices.”136  Chinese 
companies also dominate the market in solar power and 
hydropower.137 
In those industries where prices are still high, Copenhagen 
Economics and ApS note that high costs are more likely due to the 
immaturity of the technologies than to premiums on IP.138  The same 
report notes that China has been able to take advantage of certain 
kinds of technology at a lower cost than others, even with a premium 
on IP, because the efficiency of those technologies drives prices 
down.139  The World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
notes that “royalty costs for energy patents [represent] a small 
percentage of the total investment cost,”140 and Lee et al. elaborate on 
this point by explaining that it is the lack of capital and management, 
rather than IPR premiums, that bars energy technology transfer to 
developing countries.141  
 
                                                          
135  Energy and Security Group, Int’l Trade Admin., supra note 13, at 
45.  
136  INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, World Outlook, supra note 55, at 
355.  
137  Energy and Security Group, Int’l Trade Admin., supra note 13, at 
44–48.  
138   Copenhagen Economics, supra note 48, at 16.   
139  Id. at 17. 
140  Towards a Low-Carbon Economy: a Business Contribution to the 
International Energy & Climate Debate, WORLD BUSINESS COUNCIL FOR 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, 9 (2009), http://www.wbcsd.org/Page 
s/EDocument/EDocumentDetails.aspx?ID=10987&NoSearchContextKey=tr
ue.    
141  Lee et al., supra note 57, at 8.  
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C.   INCENTIVES TO PARTNER 
Foreign firms stand to gain greater returns in the long run when 
they share or develop IP with Chinese partner companies than when 
they try to deal with Chinese companies at arm’s length in order to 
protect their IP.  The traditional arguments for why IPR are a barrier 
to technology transfer assume IP originates entirely from foreign 
firms and moves entirely into the hands of Chinese firms, but in 
reality, the relationship is more complex.  In a sector that requires a 
complex body of specialized, interdependent technology and a 
business environment that values relationships, foreign firms that 
commit to sharing or developing their IP with Chinese partners can 
create relationships in which neither partner has an incentive to 
jeopardize the relationship. 
Chinese companies can offer certain complementarities to 
foreign companies that make partnerships profitable.  Chinese 
companies can help foreign companies navigate the local cultural 
environment and provide networks of local industry contacts, and 
they can provide cheaper labor and management than companies 
from industrialized countries would find at home.  Indeed, four out of 
the fourteen leading companies in wind turbine generator technology 
listed in the ITA’s 2008 report are joint ventures between a Chinese 
company and a foreign company.142 
Also, in an artificial but practical sense, Chinese companies help 
foreign companies meet local content requirements.  For example, 
Chinese regulations require foreign wind turbine manufacturers to 
manufacture a certain percentage of their equipment in China,143 and 
one convenient way for foreign firms to meet these requirements is to 
form partnerships with local manufacturers. 
While this article considers partnerships as a return factor, they 
are also a risk factor.  Partnerships not only create profitable business 
models, but also mitigate the risk that the Chinese companies will 
misappropriate the IP of their foreign counterparts.  First, 
maintaining trust and reliability in these partnerships is key to 
success, and IP theft can jeopardize such a relationship.  Second, as 
                                                          
142  Energy and Security Group, Int’l Trade Admin., supra note 13, at 
46.  
143  See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, World Outlook, supra 
note 55, at 355–56.  
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discussed earlier, many Chinese firms do not have the absorptive 
capacity to turn stolen IP directly into marketable products and 
services.  They are dependent on their foreign counterparts for 
complementary technology, just as the foreign firms are dependent 
on them for their low costs and knowledge of the local business 
environment. 
 
IV.   EMPIRICAL AND ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE 
A.   EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR CONFIDENCE IN THE IPR REGIME 
The number of patent applications filed in China, including 
applications filed by foreign firms, has increased significantly since 
the early 2000s, reflecting increased confidence in the environment 
for IPR in China.  Filing patent applications requires time and money, 
and firms have less of an incentive to file patent applications if they 
do not believe that there is a reasonable chance those patents will be 
enforced.  
Figure 3 shows the total number of patent applications filed in 
China and the respective shares of foreign and Chinese patent 
applications in total patent applications in China over the period 
1990–2011.144  Prior to China’s accession to the WTO, foreign patent 
applications reached a maximum of 30,343 and total patent 
                                                          
144  Data in Figures 3, 4, and 5 come from both the China Statistical 
Yearbooks and the State Intellectual Property Office.  Pre-2000 data come 
from the yearbooks and data from 2000 onward come from the State 
Intellectual Property Office.  See Statistics, STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
OFFICE OF THE P.R.C., http://English.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/ (last visited Jan. 3, 
2012); National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 
1999; National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 
1998; National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 
1997; National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 
1996; National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 
1995; National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 
1994; National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 
1993; National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 
1992; National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 
1991; National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 
1990.  Annual statistics published in the China Statistical Yearbooks can also 
be found at http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata. 
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applications reached a maximum of 170,682; by 2011, those figures 
climbed to 128,677 and 1,633,347, respectively.145 
 
Figure 3 Total Patent Applications in 
  China by Year, 1990-2011 
 
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, State Intellectual Property 
Office 
These data aggregate all types of patent applications in China 
(invention patents, design patents, and utility model patents), but 
Yang explains that foreign firms have filed much lower numbers of 
applications for utility model patents in China than Chinese firms 
have.146  Yang attributes this trend to the fact that most foreign patent 
systems do not have an equivalent to the utility model patent, causing 
some foreign firms to not understand them.147  As such, applications 
for utility model patents have limitations as a proxy for foreign 
confidence in China’s IPR system. Figure 4 modifies the data in 
                                                          
145  Id. 
146   Stephen Yang, Utility Model in China – an Overlooked but 
Powerful Tool, MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, (Apr. 1, 2009), 
http://www.managingip.com/Article/2176035/An-overlooked-but-powerful-
tool.html.  
147  Id. 
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Figure 3 by removing utility model patent applications, and it shows 
an increase in the share of foreign patent applications. 
 
Figure 4 Total Patent Applications in 
  China by Year Excluding 
  Applications for  Utility Model 
  Patents, 1990-2011 
 
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, State Intellectual Property 
Office 
Another limitation of the data in these figures is that they include 
applications for patents related to all kinds of technology, not just 
renewable energy technology.  Drawing on data from the China 
Statistical Yearbook, I selected eighty-nine classifications of patents 
that have potential applications in renewable energy technology,148 as 
they constitute a more representative sample of trends in renewable 
energy patenting.  Figure 5 shows applications by year for these 
eighty-nine selected patent types over the period of 2002–2010.  The 
sample is not a perfect proxy for renewable energy technology, and it 
                                                          
148  I selected the eighty-nine patent classifications in consultation with 
Dr. Kelly Sims Gallagher, Associate Professor of Energy and Environmental 
Policy, the Fletcher School, Tufts University. 
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does not distinguish between foreign and Chinese applications, as 
this data is not available for most years.  Conclusions should be 
drawn from this data with caution, but the data offers a closer picture 
of trends in renewable energy technology transfer than do all the 
patent data aggregated together, and they show a steady increase in 
applications over the period considered. 
 
Figure 5 Applications for Selected Categories of 
Patents with Potential Applications in 
Renewable Energy Technology, 2002-
2010 
 
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, State Intellectual Property 
Office 
Overall, the evidence suggests that foreign confidence in China’s 
IPR regime has increased significantly over the reform period, 
including in renewable energy.  Legal reforms, developments in 
enforcement, and low absorptive capacity have mitigated the extent 
to which concerns about IPR present risk to foreign transferors of 
technology. 
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B.   ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE FOR CONFIDENCE IN THE IPR REGIME 
This section considers the experiences of three energy 
companies—U.S. solar power company GT Solar, Danish wind 
power company Vestas, and U.S. energy company General 
Electric—as they have developed their renewable energy operations 
in China.  These three companies do not represent the full range of 
experiences that foreign renewable energy companies have had in 
China, but they represent examples of companies that are confident 
enough in China’s environment for IP that they have been willing to 
transfer their IP into the Chinese market.  Furthermore, all three of 
these companies have dramatically expanded their renewable energy 
operations in the latter half of the 2000s, as soaring demand for 
energy in China has created greater demand for renewable energy 
and the new policy framework has put in place stronger incentives to 
invest.  
 
1.   GT SOLAR 
In 2006, GT Equipment Technologies changed its name to GT 
Solar (GT).149 CEO Kedar Gupta explained the rationale behind the 
name change in a 2006 press release: 
This name change reflects the fact that most of the 
business we're conducting around the globe is in 
the solar, or photovoltaic, energy industry . . . . It's 
one of the fastest growing industries in the world, 
and GT Solar has become an industry leader. Our 
name now makes it clear that we are in the 
business of enabling technology, manufacturing 
                                                          
149 GT Equipment Technologies is Now “GT Solar,” BUS. WIRE, Aug. 
23, 2006, available at http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/gtsolar/.  GT 
Solar then changed its name to GT Advanced Technologies in 2011.  This 
section focuses on the company’s activities during the time that it was called 
GT Solar.  Press Release, GT Advanced Technologies, GT Solar Completes 
Name Change to GT Advanced Technologies (Aug. 8, 2011), 
http://investor.gtat.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=211850&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1594054&highlight=. 
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and equipment solutions for the solar industry 
worldwide.150 
In the process of “enabling technology, manufacturing and 
equipment solutions for the solar industry worldwide,” 151  the 
favorable conditions for technology transfer and the renewable 
energy industry discussed earlier in this article allowed GT to make 
major inroads in the solar photovoltaic market and invest in the 
transfer of technology to China. 
GT signed its first contract in China in 2002,152 and in the period 
from November 2004 to February 2010, GT signed at least nine 
contracts with Chinese firms, for a total value of approximately $418 
million.153  Moreover, as GT did more and more business in China 
over this period, it quickly transferred an increased amount of 
technology.  In 2004, GT signed a contract to sell direct solidification 
                                                          
150  BUS. WIRE., GT Equipment Technologies is Now “GT Solar,” supra 
note 149.   
151  Id. 
152  Press Release, GT Advanced Technologies, GT Solar Ships 1,000th 
DSS450 Crystalline Ingot Growth Furnace (July 12, 2010), http://inve 
stor.gtat.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=211850&p=irol-
newsArticle_print&ID=1446331&highlight=. 
153  See GT Equipment Signs over $33 Million Contract with Chinese 
Co.; LDK Solar Hi-Tech Co., Ltd. To Buy 75 MW Solar Wafer Fabrication 
Line, BUS. WIRE, Aug. 10, 2005, http://www.businesswire.com/ 
portal/site/gtsolar/; GT Solar to Equip One of Largest Solar Wafer Factories 
in World, BUS. WIRE, July 31, 2007, http://www.businesswire.com/portal 
/site/gtsolar/; GT Solar and Jiangxi Sornid Hi-Tech Co., Ltd. Announce New 
Order Totaling More than $20 Million for GT Solar’s GT-DSS450 Ingot 
Growth Furnace, BUS. WIRE, Feb. 17, 2010, http://www.bus 
inesswire.com/portal/site/gtsolar/; GT Solar Signs Polysilicon Reactor 
Contract With Chinese Company, BUS. WIRE, June 11, 2007, 
http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/gtsolar/; GT Solar Signs More than 
$40 Million in New Contracts with GCL-Poly, BUS. WIRE, Jan. 19, 2010, 
http://www.businesswire.com /portal/site/gtsolar/; GT Solar Technologies 
Signs $9.5 million Contract in China; Baoding Tianwei Ying li of China 
Adds Wafer Capacity for Solar Cells, BUS. WIRE, Nov. 12, 2004, 
http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/gtsolar/; GT Solar & Trina Solar 
Sign $49MM Polysilicon Reactor Contract, BUS. WIRE, Mar. 11, 2008, 
http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/gtsolar/; GT Solar & Yingli Green 
Energy Sign $56M Silicon Furnace Contract, BUS. WIRE, Nov. 26, 2007, 
http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/gtsolar/.  
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system furnaces to Baoding Tianwei Yingli New Energy 
Resources. 154   In July 2007, GT signed contracts to sell a more 
advanced model to two Chinese companies: Glory Silicon Energy 
and Yingli Green Energy.155 
Each of these three contracts is a relatively restricted example of 
technology transfer, as GT was simply transferring equipment, rather 
than developing it with a Chinese partner or teaching a Chinese 
partner how to improve upon it, but GT has also engaged in broader 
technology transfer.  In 2005, GT began transferring more tacit 
knowledge through a contract to create a 75MW wafer fabrication 
turnkey line for the Chinese firm LDK.156  At first glance, this may 
seem like another example of very basic technology transfer, but GT 
transferred more than just equipment in this arrangement.  According 
to GT’s Project Manager for the LDK facility, Charles Hagopian, 
“GT was involved from the very beginning with LDK Solar in the 
design of its factory, the installation of GT's equipment, and the 
training of LDK’s employees.”157  More recently, under two 2010 
contracts with subsidiaries of a Chinese firm, GCL-Poly Energy 
Holdings, GT committed to transferring “equipment, technology, and 
know-how” to the two subsidiaries.158 
GT also established a base in China from which to facilitate the 
diffusion of technology.  In 2006, GT established GT Solar 
(Shanghai) Co., Ltd., with offices in Shanghai and Beijing,159 and in 
2008, GT announced plans to build and operate a polysilicon facility 
                                                          
154  BUS. WIRE, GT Solar Technologies Signs $9.5 million Contract in 
China; Baoding Tianwei Yingli of China Adds Wafer Capacity for Solar 
Cells, supra note 153. 
155   BUS. WIRE, GT Solar to Equip One of Largest Solar Wafer 
Factories in World, supra note 153; BUS. WIRE, GT Solar & Yingli Green 
Energy Sign $56M Silicon Furnace Contract, supra note 153.  
156  BUS. WIRE, GT Equipment Signs over $33 Million Contract with 
Chinese Co.; LDK Solar Hi-Tech Co., Ltd. to Buy 75 MW Solar Wafer 
Fabrication Line, supra note 153. 
157  GT Solar Technologies Installs Turnkey Solar Wafer Line At LDK 
Solar; LDK Solar, China, Begins Production of One of World's Largest 
Solar Manufacturing Lines, BUS. WIRE, May 4, 2006, http://www.busi 
nesswire.com/portal/site/gtsolar/.  
158  BUS. WIRE, GT Solar Signs More than $40 Million in New Contracts 
with GCL-Poly, supra note 153.  
159 GT Solar Expands Presence in China, BUS. WIRE, Dec. 28, 2006, 
http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/gtsolar/.  
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in Lianyungang municipality, Jiangsu province.160  Finally, in 2009, 
GT opened its Asian headquarters in Shanghai, a facility that GT 
intends to use “to provide product demonstrations and training” to 
Asian customers.161 
These incremental increases in the quality of technology transfer 
would not have occurred if GT was not confident that China would 
protect GT’s IPR or that it would not receive an acceptable return on 
its investment.  GT’s experience with technology transfer was limited, 
but it grew incrementally.  GT did not go so far as to form any joint 
ventures in China, but IPR were not a barrier to its operations there, 
and it has taken advantage of increasing opportunities for deeper 
technology transfer. 
 
2.   VESTAS 
Vestas, the eighth-largest firm in the Chinese wind power 
market as of 2011,162 also took advantage of the environment for 
renewable energy in China.  While its position has slipped since, 
Vestas reached the number-two position in 2006;163 in the process, it 
sold more advanced technology to its customers in China and took a 
greater interest in transferring know-how, as well. 
Lewis notes that Vestas is relatively conservative about 
importing its IP into China, preferring to retain ownership over its 
technology.164  However, like GT, Vestas benefited from transferring 
                                                          
160   BUS. WIRE, GT Solar & Trina Solar Sign $49MM Polysilicon 
Reactor Contract, supra note 153. 
161 GT Solar Opens New Asia Headquarters in Shanghai, BUS. WIRE, 
Sept. 7, 2009, http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/gtsolar/.   
162  China World’s Wind Power Leader, XINHUA (Mar. 23, 2012), 
http://www.china.org.cn/environment/2012-03/23/content_24970321.htm.  
163   Joanna I. Lewis, A Comparison of Wind Power Industry 
Development Strategies in Spain, India and China, CENTER FOR RESOURCE 
SOLUTIONS, 15 fig.8 (2007), http://www.resourcesolutions.org/lib/librarypd 
fs/Lewis.Wind.Industry. Development.India.Spain.China.July.2007.pdf.  
164   See Joanna I. Lewis, From Technology Transfer to Local 
Manufacturing: China’s Emergence in the Global Wind Power Industry, 
Presentation at the Woodrow Wilson Center’s China Environment Forum at 
9 (Oct. 2, 2006), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/events/doc 
s/CEF.Talk.Lewis.10.06.ppt.  
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increasingly sophisticated equipment to its Chinese customers.  On 
December 17, 2009, Vestas announced that it recently received the 
first order for its V60-850 kW turbine, designed specifically for 
Chinese customers, from China Datang Renewable Power Co., Ltd. 
(Datang).165  Just eleven days later, Vestas announced that Datang 
ordered a line of more advanced turbine from Vestas, the V90-2.0 
MW turbine.166 
Vestas was actually transferring softer technology to China as 
early as 2007.  Vestas opened two manufacturing facilities in 
Tianjian in 2007: a generator factory and a factory for the assembly 
of nacelles and hubs.167  In order to prepare the Tianjin facility to 
begin manufacturing V52-850 kW turbines, Vestas invited Chinese 
employees to its nacelle factory in Taranto, Italy to train with the 
Italian team for two months.168 
While Vestas’s experience with technology transfer is not as 
deep as GT’s, its decision to abandon its restrictive model of 
technology transfer reflects that it recognized that its future in China 
requires greater Chinese ownership of its know-how. 
 
3.   GENERAL ELECTRIC 
General Electric (GE) has been doing business in China for over 
100 years,169 and it has proactively taken advantage of the favorable 
                                                          
165  Press Release, Vestas, Vestas Receives First Order for Its Made-for-
China Wind Turbine (Dec. 17, 2009), http://www.vestas.com/files//Filer/ 
EN/Press_releases/Local/2009/CH_091217_LPR_UK_07.pdf.  
166  Press Release, Vestas, Valued Chinese partner shows confidence in 
Vestas product line (Dec. 28, 2009), a http://www.vestas.com/files//Filer/ 
EN/Press_releases/Local/2009/CH_091228_LPR_UK_08.pdf.  
167   Press Release, Vestas, Customer day at Vestas’ manufacturing 
facilities in Tianjin, China (Sept. 20, 2007), http://www.vestas.com/files// 
Filer/EN/Press_releases/Local/2007/AP070920LPMUK01.pdf.  
168 Vestas, Taranto Technology Transfer, 12 WIND, OIL, & GAS, May 
2008, at 45, available at http://nozebra.ipapercms.dk/Vestas/Vestas 
Wind/UK/1208/?Page=43.  
169   GE, People's Republic of China Sign Memorandum of 
Understanding on Environmental Technology; Energy, Water, Rail, 
Aviation, Lighting Opportunities Included; Energy and Environment 
Research Pact with Tsinghua University Also Signed, BUS. WIRE, May 29, 
2006, http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/ge/index.jsp?ndmViewId=n 
ews_view&newsId=20060528005017&newsLang=en&ndmConfigId=10011
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environment for renewable energy in China in the last few years.  In 
a September 2009 interview, Tim Schweikert, president of GE 
Transportation China, said that GE views China as its “second home 
market,” because of China’s size and growth. 170   GE made 
technology transfer a regular part of its business in China, but GE 
only recently moved into renewable energy technology transfer in 
China.  Unlike GT, which specializes entirely in renewable energy 
technology, GE has a wide variety of operations in different energy 
sources, such as oil and gas. 
GE laid the groundwork for technology transfer in China in the 
early 2000s, but it did not fully commit itself to renewable energy in 
China.  In 2000, GE established the China Technology Center in 
Shanghai, 171 although the center only played a supporting role in 
research at the time.172  GE was also providing gas turbines and 
related equipment to Chinese firms in the early 2000s,173 and some 
GE turbines had been assembled in China as of 2006, under a 
technology transfer agreement.174 
GE then strengthened its relationships in China by signing a 
memorandum of understanding with China’s National Development 
and Reform Commission in 2006. 175   The motivation for the 
agreement, according to GE, was “the growing synergy between 
China's needs and GE technology, explicitly allowing for GE to 
                                                                                                                
09&vnsId=681.  
170 Jialu Chen, ‘Global Reset’ Sees China Poised for Growth, CHINA 
DAILY, Sept. 12, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009summerda 
vos/200909/12/content_8684235.htm.  
171 Kevin Bullis, GE to Boost Research in China, TECH. REV., Apr. 8, 
2010, http://www.technologyreview.com/ energy/25008/.  
172   Id. 
173  GE Wins Contracts of US$900M to Supply Gas Turbines for Power 
Plants in China, BUS. WIRE, Mar. 7, 2003, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/ 
GE+Wins+Contracts+of+US$900M+to+Supply+Gas+Turbines+for+Power+
Plants...-a098467131.  
174  GE, NTC Shipped First China-Assembled 9E Gas Turbine, GE IN 
CHINA, no. 10 (Gen. Elec., Fairfield, Conn.), July, 2006, available at  
http://www.ge.com.cn/enewsletter/geinchina10.htm#business3.  
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Understanding on Environmental Technology; Energy, Water, Rail, Aviation, 
Lighting Opportunities Included; Energy and Environment Research Pact 
with Tsinghua University Also Signed, supra note 169. 
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provide advanced technologies to China,” including renewable 
energy technology.176  Under the agreement, GE agreed to provide up 
to $50 million in funding for “eco-related” research to the China 
Technology Center, as well as management and leadership training 
for up to 2,500 Chinese managers and leaders, through 2011.177  GE 
itself explained that this increasing cooperation with China is the 
result of policy and financial incentives put in place by the Chinese 
government, as well as a synergy that enhances GE’s bottom line.178  
Most recently, in August 2009, GE Drivetrain Technologies, a unit of 
GE Transportation, formed a joint venture with a Chinese company, 
Chongqing XinXing Fengneng Investment Co., Ltd. (XinXing), to 
produce drivetrain gears for wind turbines in China.179  Under the 
terms of the agreement, XinXing is the majority shareholder in the 
joint venture,180 reflecting GE’s willingness to invest in technology 
transfer to its Chinese partners. 
GE made use of its reputation and relationships in China, as well 
as the favorable policy environment, to develop a successful business 
model for renewable energy in China.  In doing so, it allowed its 
Chinese counterparts, such as the GE Technology Center, to play a 
major role in research and development.  
 
V.   CONCLUSION 
Despite arguments from industrialized and developing countries 
that IPR are a barrier to technology transfer, the evidence shows that 
concerns over IPR are not a significant barrier to the transfer of 
renewable energy technology to China.  The potential for growth in 
China’s renewable energy sector and the policy support for that 
growth, the relative insignificance of IP premiums as a factor in 
pricing, and the incentives for foreign firms to partner with Chinese 
firms provide foreign firms with enough expected return on its 
investment in technology transfer. 
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Even with high expected returns, technology transfer in the 
broader sense—encompassing the transfer of knowledge-based 
assets—would not occur if foreign firms felt that the risk in exposing 
their IP to a loosely regulated market was too high.  The data 
presented in this paper, however, show that China’s efforts to reform 
its IPR laws since the 1990s produced greater confidence among 
foreign firms in China’s ability to protect their IPR.  Indeed, the 
experiences of the three individual companies considered here—GT, 
Vestas, and GE—show that, at the very least, concerns over IPR do 
not have to be a significant barrier in technology transfer. 
There are limitations to the discussion in this article, and issues 
for further investigation remain.  First, this article relies on proxy 
evidence to support some of its conclusions, as some data that is 
specific to the renewable energy sector is difficult to obtain.  For this 
reason, the author draws some conclusions with caution.  Second, 
this article does not examine any normative hypotheses.  The roles of 
China and other countries in international efforts to stop global 
climate change are subjects of debate, and this article investigates 
only whether concerns over IPR have been a barrier to technology 
transfer, not whether they should be.  Finally, the relationship 
between IPR and technology transfer is not static, and this paper only 
investigates the relationship between IPR and technology transfer up 
to a point in time.  Absorptive capacity is currently an issue for 
Chinese firms, but that capacity will increase as those firms develop 
their own technology and expertise in the coming years.  China has 
made remarkably fast progress in several national-level indicators, 
such as its gross domestic product181  and share of its population 
above the poverty line,182 and there is no reason to believe that China 
must or will rely on foreign renewable energy technology forever.  
At the same time, it is possible that the quality of IPR protection will 
continue to improve enough to deter IP leakage in the renewable 
energy industry, or foreign and Chinese firms may become so 
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interdependent that their shared stakes in mutual success deter the 
theft of IP.  Regardless of how the relationship between IPR and 
technology transfer in the renewable energy sector evolves, the 
global importance of renewable energy, especially in China, deserves 
continued attention. 
